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In the last century, a variety of ideologies flourished
in the Muslim world that was still grappling with the long
lasting effects of its encounter with the West. A number
of discourses on gender, all purporting to better
women’s lives, were popular, at one time or another: the
discourses of secularism, modernism, reformism, tradi-
tionalism, state feminism and even Islamism. In the early
20th century, Modernist voices were championing
women’s cause, at a time when Islamists began to make
similar claims. Islamists have now become the new tradi-
tional, and often the most vocal, forces of contemporary
Muslim societies, resistant to some, but not all changes.
The religio-political activism of Muslims holding college
and university degrees, many of whom are professionals
and who belong to the new urban middle-classes, fo-
cuses on the rejection of any type of dichotomy between
the religious and the secular realms. Islam must shape
and mold all aspects of Muslim society and Muslims
must strive, in any way they can, to achieve this goal. Con-
temporary Islamism, however, is far from being mere
religious traditionalism. In what follows, it will be argued
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that contemporary Egyptian Islamist discourses are quite
modern constructs. This can best be illustrated by
presenting diachronically the gender discourses of a
number of important Egyptian Islamists.
The founder of the foremost contemporary Islamist
movement, the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood (founded
in 1928), Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949) envisioned an Is-
lamist project that would restore the past glories of the
Muslim world.1 This utopian ideology would become
reality only by way of a return to the ‘true’ Islam and an
elimination of any kind of foreign dominations over the
Muslim world.2 With such a utopian goal, the Islamist ‘re-
storative’ project was to develop into a highly political
ideology. In an ever-changing world, Islamist activism
continues to ‘reaffirm’ Muslim values and thus provides
the movement with its deep moral underpinning that is
not without any consequence for the status of Muslim
women. Al-Banna wrote that the movement must
struggle in order “that a free Islamic state may arise in
this free fatherland, acting according to the precepts of
Islam, applying its social regulations…,” a political
project that led the movement to be outlawed in Egypt in
1954.3 The movement is still unable to officially partici-
pate in Egyptian political life.
The discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood movement
emerged as a ‘product of crisis’ and the result of the
‘cross-cultural interplay’ between Europe and the Mus-
lim world. This encounter led the Islamic world to es-
pouse a ‘revivalist mentality.’4 The earlier formulations of
the Islamist discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood move-
ment remains quite typical of a number of contemporary
Islamist discourses that are, for the most part, indebted
to the earlier Islamist ideology of the Muslim Brother-
hood movement. The cross-cultural interplay between
the West and the Islamic world has helped shape the na-
ture of the Islamists’ traditional, yet simultaneously mod-
ern discourses on women.
Qatar-based Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who re-
cently turned down the leadership of the Muslim Broth-
erhood,5 and Egyptian Heba Raouf Ezzat, two contempo-
rary Islamist figures, propose ‘Islamically progressive’
views on Muslim women’s role, status, and rights in Mus-
lim societies. A number of these views have gained in
popularity among many segments of the Muslim popula-
tion, but one may ask to what extent, and in what sense
can their views on Muslim women, claimed to be
‘progressive,’ be truly modern? Claims made by contem-
porary Islamists al-Qaradawi and Ezzat can be shown to
have their roots in the writings of earlier Islamists, such
as al-Banna and his most important successor, Sayyid
Qutb (d. 1966), who wrote during the second quarter of
the 20th century, and whose ideas found an expression in
the social and political struggle of Zaynab al-Ghazali. The
claimed ‘progressive’ views of earlier Islamists on
women’s issues have never really ceased to be part of the
revivalist discourse of Islamists on Muslim women, as at-
tested by the recent views of al-Qaradawi and Ezzat.
New discourses on women’s role, status, and rights
emerged out of the Muslim world’s encounter with the
West and its modernity (understood in a broad sense).
This encounter triggered the emergence of novel cross-
cultural developments, even in the religious realm. Vari-
ous Muslim groups advocated a number of rights for
women, albeit often within the traditional religious
framework. For instance, the Egyptian Society for the
Progress of Women (founded in 1908) tried to show
Muslim women how Islam had historically provided them
with more rights than their Western sisters.6
Appeal to the traditional discourse of the Islamic reli-
gious tradition to argue for more rights for women re-
mains paradoxical, but not without its own justification.
Kandiyoti has tried to explain women’s adherence to tra-
ditional discourses, their relationship with women’s
rights and traditional Muslim societies by appealing to a
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notion of ‘patriarchal bargain,’ whereby change is en-
dorsed through the accommodation of traditional reli-
gious values.7 Accommodation allows women to negoti-
ate greater freedom from within the strictures of
patriarchal society and with the values and principles it
upholds. The same phenomenon occurs today in Iran.
Khosrokhavar identifies this strategy as the actions of ‘lat-
eral actors’ who possess, nonetheless, real agency: “for-
mally respecting the social norms and rules and contest-
ing them in a responsible manner … embedding it within
Iranian tradition, religion, and culture … in such a way
as to undermine it [that is, male domination] from
underneath.”8 The strategy has remained a viable alterna-
tive all over the Muslim world throughout the last cen-
tury. Paradoxically, this strategy appears to have in-
creased in popularity in the last two or three decades,
especially within the ranks of urban, middle-class women
Islamists.
The increased demands for greater rights for women
are indicative of on-going changes that have befallen the
Muslim world.9 Muslim women’s lives have undergone
tremendous changes during the last hundred years.
Women were provided with education, became literate
and entered the labor market in increasingly greater
numbers. These changes have gradually altered Muslim
attitudes towards women’s role in society. These changes
have fashioned a new awareness and played a role in the
emergence of new gender discourses, a new ‘episteme’
with which to think about Muslim women.10 At the outset
of the 20th century, women of all political and ideological
persuasions campaigned for women’s cause. Egyptian
women formed associations, started journals, wrote in
the nationalist press, and associated themselves to
political parties.11 Islamist women joined in these new
social and political activities during the latter part of the
1800s and the 1900s.
The project of the Islamists to ‘re-Islamize’ Egyptian
society, through Islamic education and the services pro-
vided by their charitable organizations, had but one goal:
the establishment of a ‘truly’ Islamic society ruled by an
Islamic government.12 Capitalizing on human resources,
the Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood en-
couraged Muslim women to struggle, side by side with
men, for the Islamic ‘Call’ (da‘wa). Social activism was
not prohibited. Women were permitted, even encouraged
to be engaged in the social realm and, to a lesser extent,
in the  political realm, as long as their social and political
activities for the Islamic cause were not undertaken at the
expense of their domestic responsibilities. Al-Banna
believed that “destroying the integrity of the family and
threatening the happiness of the home” was one of the
social causes of the dissolution of the Islamic state.13 This
new call for the social and political activism of women
was, however, quite new and modern. The Islamist
movement developed its own distinctive gender dis-
courses, a mixture of traditional religious conservative
ideas, along side modern ones, producing a new hybrid,
neo-traditional gender discourse compatible with its ‘re-
storative’ ideological project.
In the early 1950s, Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) became the
new leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. In his Social Jus-
tice in Islam, he identified human equality as one of the
foundations of social justice in Islam.14 Although he did
not discard a number of traditional gender-biased con-
ceptions, Qutb was, nonetheless, calling for greater gen-
der equality, in line with new emerging discourses of
equality between women and men. He provided explana-
tions and justifications for some of the inequalities found
in the Scriptures and the religious (legal) tradition. For
instance, he explained the different shares inherited by
men and women by appealing to men and women’s
different ‘responsibilities.’ He asserted that women have
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a ‘natural capacity and skills’ for managing the
household, making it possible for him to appeal to
women’s ‘greater right to care’ and man’s ‘right of man-
agement.’ Qutb’s ‘distributive’ notion of equality remains
a staple of Islamist discourses. The notion of equality is
often opposed to, or even replaced with a notion of
‘complementarity,’ that is, women and men are equal,
yet different, thus providing some grounds for a
justification of some of the religious inequalities. Qutb in-
sisted upon equality, not only in religious and spiritual
matters, but also in economic and financial matters,
which he traced back to the Scriptures, where it is stated
that both men and women share a common origin
(Qur’an, 7:189), making each one of them an “equal half
of the one ‘soul’.”15 Islamist interpreters of the religious
tradition and of the Qur’an will argue for some kind of Is-
lamic women’s rights. Their works have become models
for hundreds of similar works on women in Islam whose
sophistication and success remains to be analyzed.
In spite of the traditional roles of mothers and wives
that it promoted, the Islamist discourse of the Muslim
Brotherhood appealed to a growing number of Muslims.
Their discourse provided Islamic ‘empowerment’ to Mus-
lim women in the social and political spheres, as long as
they were working for the Islamic ‘Call.’ Zaynab al-
Ghazali, for example, joined the first Egyptian women’s
organization, the Egyptian Feminist Union, but was soon
discontented as women’s liberation movement is a
‘deviant innovation,’ the result of Muslim’s backward-
ness. Al-Ghazali believes that the departure from the true
teachings of Islam was the cause of women’s suffering.
The only solution to this suffering is the return to true
Islamic teachings. Al-Ghazali’s solution was to found her
own Muslim Women’s Association. Eventually, she joined
the Muslim brotherhood (in 1949) as an active member,
was arrested in 1965, tortured for belonging to a banned
organization, and eventually released.16
Like the projects of al-Banna and Qutb, Zaynab al-
Ghazali’s project was the re-Islamization of society. Islam-
ists were being discredited by the secular and moderniz-
ing forces for their backwardness, but they held steadfast
to the belief that the real backwardness of Muslim society
was the result of Muslims’ estrangement from Islam. A
renewed social activism was required to promote a
return to Islamic values. The Islamists’ call for women’s
social and political activism is, nonetheless, a product of
modern times and has never been a historically
significant element of the Islamic tradition. The new
impetus provided by these ideas is illustrated with al-
Ghazali’s own life story. She included in her first mar-
riage contract a stipulation that allowed her to obtain a
divorce if her husband disagreed with her Islamic activ-
ism. Her second husband provided her with a written
agreement that stipulated that he would help her in the
Islamic ‘Call.’ After the death of her second husband, al-
Ghazali could argue that she had fulfilled her religious
duty in marriage, refused to remarry and dedicated the
rest of her life to the Islamic ‘Call.’17 Women have used a
number of ‘Islamic’ stipulations into their marriage con-
tracts to better their conditions, but stipulations like
those included by al-Ghazali are almost unheard. Islamist
women are thus willing to use the resources of Islamic
legal prescriptions to their own advantage, opening new
Islamically defined opportunities that enables them to
venture into traditionally inaccessible male public
spheres.
The social and political activism of women such as al-
Ghazali, in the name of the Islamic ‘Call,’ although a
modern novelty, remains in line with al-Banna’s and
Qutb’s vision of women’s social activism for the Islamic
cause. For al-Ghazali, women constitute a “fundamental
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part of the Islamic call.” She argued that women can be
more active than men, because, in accordance with the
Islamist vision of gender relations, men are the providers
of the household. In addition, women’s social and politi-
cal roles constitute undeniably a highly ethical endeavor.
Muslim women “build the kind of men that we need to
fill the ranks of the Islamic call.” Women are the pillars
of a virtuous Islamic society. To fulfill their role in the re-
building of the Islamic nation, women need to be edu-
cated, cultured, and knowledgeable about the precepts
of the Qur’an, the Islamic tradition, of world politics, etc.
Once they have fulfilled their god-given roles, the “first,
holy, and most important mission is to be a mother and
wife,” something they cannot “ignore,” they can then
embark on their utopian mission.18 It should come to no
surprise that the roles of Muslim women as mothers and
wives become religiously ‘essentialized’ roles.
Domesticity becomes the envisioned horizon of women’s
natural and primordial activities.
Islamists are calling for greater gender equality in a
number of specific social spheres. Women Islamists ad-
vocate gender equality, especially in the realm of educa-
tion. The right to education no longer remains restricted
to men alone. Al-Ghazali did send a memorandum to the
Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia to have girls educated.19 In a
sense, Islamists have internalized the modernizing aims
of the modern Muslim states, embodied in their insis-
tence on the nation-building values of education. Similar
‘transformative values’ can now serve the Islamist ‘restor-
ative’ project which they often envision as resting more
specifically on religious education. Al-Ghazali’s own per-
sonal social endeavors for the Islamic ‘Call’ included
teaching classes on the Qur’an.
Traditional religious Islamic views on women were
undergoing a parallel process of change that was to ac-
commodate notions of greater equality between the gen-
ders. During the 1960s and the 1970s, attitudes among
the religious class continued to change. Mahmud Shaltut,
rector of the Egyptian Sunni al-Azhar University from
1958 to 1963, and ‘Abd al-Halim Mahmud, rector from
1973 to 1978, upheld what Stowasser labels a ‘more
egalitarian gender paradigm.’ Their novel, albeit discreet
discourses on women originated from within the wall of
the thousand year old Sunni religious institution of
higher education.20 During the same period, the
ideologue of the Islamic regime in Khartoum (Sudan)
proposed similar Islamist views on gender equality in his
Women in Islam and Muslim Society.21 Other leading reli-
gious figures and intellectuals, like Muhammad al-
Ghazali, a much read Islamist author throughout the last
quarter of the 20th century, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, both
al-Azhar University graduates, although not part of the
Egyptian religious ‘establishment,’ proposed novel Islam-
ist gender discourses articulated in terms of women’s
and  men’s ‘humanity and personhood.’ In fact, it was
only during the last twenty years “that the affirmation of
women’s political rights emerged in the clerical and Is-
lamist discourse” which Stowasser wonderfully illus-
trated.22
Two contemporary proponents of a renewed Islamist
discourse on gender equality, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and
Heba Raouf Ezzat, co-founded the popular Qatar based
web site on Islam.23 Al-Qaradawi has become one of the
Arab world’s foremost media religious leaders (ulama)
with his popular weekly TV program on Islam that
reaches over 20 million Arabs, the Islamic version of
American televangelists. Al-Qaradawi’s status of cleric
and the legitimacy provided by his Al-Azhar Sunni Univer-
sity training allows him to propose novel interpretations
of Islam to a receptive audience. In the same manner, he
can criticize traditional interpretations and the causes of
their prevalence. He can propose interpretations that
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attempt to bridge the gap between tradition and
modernity. In his 1994 Collections of Fatwas (2 vols.), al-
Qaradawi rejected a number of traditional interpretations
on women and politics that signaled a significant
development within traditionalist circles.24 Zaman has
shown the relevance of ulamas, or religious leaders, as
‘custodians’ of change in the contemporary Muslim
world,25 while Hooker has shown how contemporary
fatwas, or religious legal opinions, can reflect social
changes.26 The fact that a religious scholar of Islamist al-
legiance is voicing these new views indicates a growing
consensus on these matters. An increasing number of re-
ligious leaders appear to have become more receptive to
the reassessment of the place and role of women in Mus-
lim society. One reason may be the efforts of a growing
number of religious leaders to align themselves with new
realities and understandings of women’s contemporary
political and social roles.
Al-Qaradawi advocates greater social and political
roles for Muslim women who are engaged in the ‘Call.’
He condemns the increased shunning of women in Is-
lamist gatherings and the views that advocate greater con-
trol and restriction on women’s social and political
participation. He criticizes the “misogyny [that] abounds
in the pronouncements of many Islamic ‘scholars’ and
‘imams’ “ that he believes are responsible for the fact that
entire societies “have mistreated their female members
despite the fact that Islam has honored and empowered
the women in all spheres of life. The woman in Islamic
Law is equal to her male counterpart.”27 Al-Qaradawi
attempts to empower women within the Muslim
community, especially in the public sphere, where
women have historically been excluded. His position is
reminiscent of the ones upheld by earlier Islamists, like
al-Banna and Qutb who both envisioned a more active
role for Muslim women who were working for the ‘Call.’
Al-Qaradawi still needs to argue for this equality be-
tween women and men. He argues with theological and
jurisprudential arguments that were put forward earlier
by Shaltut (d. 1963) (for example, equality regarding
‘blood-money,’ the money that must be paid to the family
of the victim to compensate a death, equal liability for
one’s actions, and equality of testimony, since women’s
“testimony is demanded and valid in court”).28 Al-
Qaradawi rejects the idea of inequality, first, by means of
an exegesis of scriptural passages (Qur’an, 33:33-34)
that allows him to ‘contextualize’ revelation and to
highlight historical counter-examples to seclusion. He
then proceeds to present early interpretations that
contradict later misogynic interpretations. He also
provides an argument, from an Islamic legal (shari‘a)
point of view, that confinement is not the normal state of
affair, but that it rather constitutes only a Qur’anic legal
punishment for adultery (Qur’an, 4:1-5). The extension
of exclusion is thus narrowed (but not eliminated) to its
specific legal context. Finally, al-Qaradawi introduces the
concept of modesty to replace the one of seclusion
(Qur’an, 33: 33).29 Although the Qur’an remains at the
forefront of any Islamist interpretation of equality, at-
tempts are made to overcome traditional unequal under-
standing of the place of Muslim women in Islam that find
their origins in the Scriptures.
For Islamists, the blueprint for a truly Islamic society
and the Islamic ideals of gender equality remains the
Scriptures. The interpretative strategies with which they
attempt to make sense of scriptural discrepancies in the
face of their claims to gender equality reflect the measure
of their willingness to engage with modernity. Al-
Qaradawi does not discard unequal Qur’anic prescrip-
tions, such as the testimony of two women equating that
of one man or discarding women’s testimony ‘altogether’
for major crimes and those requiring ‘retaliation’ (that is,
the blood-money to pay to the family of the victim), but
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instead provides what may be labeled ‘naturalistic’
reasons for these Qur’anic injunctions. By appealing to
women’s intrinsic ‘nature,’ he, cannot fail, in the end, to
justify and legitimize these unequal prescriptions. He can
only state that the explicit inequality of treatment
between women and men found in some Qur’anic
passages does not take anything away from women’s
‘humanity and integrity.’ Attempting to salvage tradition,
al-Qaradawi reasserts a certain type of gender inequality,
although he attempts, at times, to argue that some
aspects of Islamic Law ‘do’ recognize gender equality. A
number of al-Qaradawi’s arguments for equality rest on
those that were developed by Shaltut. Al-Qaradawi does
not, however, use Shaltut’s refutation (for example, that
a woman’s testimony cannot be equated with that of a
man) to draw the ‘necessary’ conclusion for a ‘real’
equality between women and men. This is indeed a
prudent traditionalist reflex in view of his more
traditional audience.
A tension inevitably subsists between new discourses
on Islamic equality and those of traditional interpreta-
tions. A similar tension arises regarding al-Qaradawi’s
ideas on women’s authority and gender differentiation.
Al-Qaradawi’s negotiations with modern and traditional
understandings clearly illustrate possibilities of thinking
outside the boundaries of the tradition, although he re-
fuses to openly take more perilous stands. The main
concerns of Islamists remain to ensure that women are
provided with the social and political opportunities that
will enable them to become productive contributors of
society, first and foremost, as mothers and wives of stead-
fast Muslims, but also as active members of Muslim
associations, working for the ‘transformative’ project that
rests at the heart of the Islamic ‘Call.’ Islamists like al-
Qaradawi may, in fact, be viewing women’s social and
political activism in a rather ‘instrumentalist’ fashion, in a
manner not so different than al-Banna’s own earlier po-
sition. Gender equality takes a second place to the re-
quirements of the Islamic ‘Call’ which requires an in-
creasingly greater number of socially and politically ac-
tive Muslim women.
More recently, however, women Islamists have advo-
cated their own brand of social activism and, as a conse-
quence, have become Islam’s new interpreters. Unhappy
with the term feminism, they often deconstruct it in an
attempt to take into account their own experiences and
to ‘re-appropriate’ their own Muslim identity. In so doing,
these women challenge western understandings of the
term. The gender discourses of these women Islamists
put forward familiar ideas. For instance, Heba Raouf
Ezzat promotes a number of al-Qaradawi’s ideas. It may
well be legitimate to ask what might the relation between
al-Qaradawi’s views and those of women Islamists on
gender equality be. Al-Qaradawi’s new ‘womanist’ dis-
course may, in fact, signal recognition by religious lead-
ers of the inescapable challenges that the increased
voices of Muslim women in general and Islamist women
in particular create for Islam, al-Ghazali and Ezzat being
two cases in point.
A political theorist lecturing at Cairo University and at
ease with western scholarship, Ezzat belongs to the new
generation of university-educated Islamist women who
write about women in Islam. She analyzes gender
equality in light of the Scriptures and those Qur’anic
verses that promote an Islamic notion of ‘gender
complementarity,’ a notion that pays full respect to
‘housewifery’ and motherhood. Ezzat’s motto is to “liber-
ate women, and still keep the family,” the latter consist-
ing of the primary and fundamental social structure of
Muslim society.30 The objective might be laudable in it-
self, but it determines, from the outset, the conclusions
she will draw in her political analyses of women role in
society. Although women ‘can,’ do ‘have’ the choice to
hold a public office, their primary domestic responsibili-
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ties prevent the majority of them to succeed in the politi-
cal arena, as “only few women can practically manage
both the responsibilities of family and jurisdiction [that
is, holding a public office].”31 Domesticity appears to be
lurking not far away from her ‘exception’ rule.
Political opportunities, available to both women and
men, at least for the few ‘exceptional’ women, need to be
matched with similar social opportunities. A call for
unlimited access to both education and employment
now defines this new social equality between the gen-
ders. In this perspective, the veil becomes a means of
‘empowerment’ for women who can now “use the veil
pragmatically to get room to maneuver, enlarge their
scope of action and increase their independent mobility
… in the social world outside domestic boundaries, a
strategy that is legitimized by religious authoritative dis-
course.”32 Such statements exemplify Ezzat’s use of the
‘patriarchal bargain’ to advocate change through a pro-
cess of accommodation of traditional religious values
and to negotiate greater freedom from within the stric-
tures of the patriarchal society. The promotion of both
education and women’s social involvement (not merely
employment) remains a main feature of today’s Islamist
gender discourse, but, as mentioned earlier, the empha-
sis on and legitimization of women’s social activities goes
back at least to the first quarter of the 20th century. Her
renewed demands for the social betterment of women’s
situation, through education and employment, do not
appear to be something significantly novel in the writings
of Ezzat who belongs to the third generation of Egyptian
Islamist. Such demands, nonetheless, point to the
sustained relevance of a number of modern ideas
present in Islamist discourses.
Ezzat’s fight for woman’s rights, albeit within the con-
fines of the Islamic tradition, can be labeled a feminist
struggle, as her aim remains the betterment of women’s
situation. Ezzat, however, understands feminism in
Islamist terms. Feminism is the product of the seculariza-
tion of western society, one of the stages of its
development that is fundamentally incompatible with Is-
lam.33 For Ezzat, fighting for women’s rights undoubtedly
does not transform one into a feminist: “I am not an
Islamic feminist”34 and “I don’t search [for ideas] outside
Islam, and there’s no such thing as Islamic feminism.”35
In a fashion akin to the criticisms made by critics of cul-
tural relativism, Ezzat criticizes the universal claims that
feminism makes, as mere historical and contingent prod-
ucts, based on her Islamist assumption that Islam’s own
version of women’s rights is the only universal version of
women’s rights. This is where some of the limitations of
her feminist understanding may rest.
Ezzat also attacks feminism for having been co-opted
by the State. The State is responsible for the ‘erosion’ of
Islamic Family Law and the State’s curtailment of the ac-
tivities of Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brother-
hood and has used feminism to achieve its goal. Histori-
cally, legal approaches have been privileged in the Arab
and Muslim world in order to introduce legal changes in
the States’ efforts to promote more gender equality. Ezzat
criticizes these legal approaches primarily because they
did not address the real causes of inequality which have
economical, political and social causes. Her major qualm
rests with the erosion of traditional Islamic Family Law,
the underlying assumption of her criticism of the State
and feminism being that such legal changes would be
unnecessary if Muslim states provided justice and equal-
ity (social, political, economic, etc.). A true Islamic state
would and should uphold precisely the type of justice
and equality which the Muslim Brotherhood movement is
advocating. More fundamentally, however, her concerns
rests with her belief that the existence of Islamism itself
that is threatened: “the feminist movement has become
one of the allies of the regimes against the
‘fundamentalist’ threat.”36 In addition to being an exter-
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nal western threat, feminism becomes an internal threat,
as an instrument of the State in its efforts to eliminate the
Islamists.
The meeting of the discourses of tradition and moder-
nity once again creates a tension. Like al-Qaradawi, Ezzat
adopts, on the one hand, traditional values, those of
motherhood, housewifery and the primacy of Islamic
Family Law (without any discussion of its consequences
for women) and, on the other hand, modern values,
those of active social, economical and political roles for
women. The latter modern values have certainly been
historically absent from traditional interpretations of
women’s role, rights and status in Islam. The work of
Lois Lamya al-Faruqi on Islamic identity and the ‘alien’ in-
fluences that have been imposed on Muslims exhibits
similar tensions. Al-Faruqi identifies feminism as one of
the “certain alien ideological intrusions on our societies,
ignorance, and distortion of the true Islam, or exploita-
tion by individuals within the society.”37 Her ‘nativism’38
pushes her to focus on, and appeal to genuine indig-
enous values and culture (associated with Islam), allow-
ing her to state that “if feminism is to succeed in an Is-
lamic environment, it must be an indigenous form of
feminism” which most Muslim women would believe is
Islam’s true egalitarian principles of justice. For today’s
Islamists, Muslim women’s salvation is in Islam: “pre-
scriptions that are found in the Qur’an and in the ex-
ample of the Prophet Muhammad […] are regarded as
the ideal to which contemporary women wish to re-
turn.”39 The tension between traditional and modern val-
ues is only one of the manifestations of a ‘struggle for
identity’ for contemporary Muslims in the face of increas-
ing western encroachment and an even more rapidly
increasing globalization. This tension is also reflected in
the gender discourses of Islamists.
The few examples provided illustrate how even con-
temporary religious Islamist discourses, although intrin-
sically traditional in nature, attempt to align themselves
with contemporary values, such as gender equality and
women’s rights discourses. These examples provide
some credence to Hymowitz’s claim that “Islamic femi-
nism can affirm the dignity of Islam, while at the same
time bringing it more in line with modernity.”40 The man-
ner in which Islamists achieve this goal still remains to be
fully examined, but the preceding contextualization of
some present day Islamist discourse, in the light of
earlier Islamist discourses on women yields, however,
unexpected results and illustrates how the contemporary
views of al-Qaradawi, Ezzat, or al-Faruqi on Muslim
women, their role, status, and rights find their roots in
the earlier Islamist discourses of al-Banna’, Qutb, and
even al-Ghazali.
The modern elements incorporated in today’s Islam-
ist discourses on gender equality and women’s rights,
none of which are merely traditional discourses, are
equally important to understand the Islamist discourse.
Their revivalist approaches create new modern under-
standings, neither purely traditional nor purely mod-
ern.41 Today’s Islamist discourses constitute ‘modern
constructs’ that attempt to remain traditional, while
adopting specifically modern components.42 Contempo-
rary values such as education and the possibility for
women to engage in social and political activities, espe-
cially for the Islamic cause, have become intrinsic parts of
their new contemporary claims.43 The presence of these
two seemingly opposing and contradictory elements may
account for the present popularity that Islamist
discourses enjoys in many Muslims countries.
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